The early game theory models of agonistic behaviour predicted that animals should not signal their agonistic intent (i.e. their probability of attack) to their opponents. As Maynard-Smith (1982a) argued, if animals signalled their agonistic motivation during a fight, there would be strong selection pressure for animals to 'bluff' and to signal the highest motivational state possible, since this would deter some opponents without the signaller having to expend the energy needed for fighting. Therefore such a signalling system would soon be invaded by cheaters and become unreliable.
Nevertheless, some animals do appear to signal their intent during agonistic encounters (e.g. Hauser & Nelson 1991; Wilson 1992) . Modifications of the earlier game theory models have suggested that signalling agonistic intentions (i.e. the likelihood of subsequent attack) during a fight may be an evolutionarily stable strategy under some conditions (Maynard Smith 1982b; Enquist 1985; Turner & Huntingford 1986; Wilson 1992) . For example, in populations in which there is individual recognition, 'bluffing' may not be possible (van Rhijn & Vodegel 1980) . In other cases, the conventional signalling of intention may remain in a population if the cost of cheating is very high (Maynard Smith & Harper 1988) . For example, Waas (1991a, b) found that he could predict the response of the little blue penguin, Eudyptula minor, during an agonistic encounter by the behaviour pattern that it showed to its opponent. He argued that, in this system, using a display representing a high motivational state was a 'risky' behaviour and entailed certain costs, such as an increased chance that the displaying animal would be attacked.
The cephalopod Sepia officinalis (cuttlefish) exhibits a specific body pattern during agonistic
